How the vault is protected
Every file in the vault is encrypted. The passcode opens it only together with a secret that never leaves the device, so a copy opens nowhere else.
iPhone and iPad
Android
Mac
Windows
Every file is sealed with XChaCha20-Poly1305, in pieces that are each bound to their file and their place in it. Nothing can be changed, swapped, repeated or cut off unnoticed, and what was tampered with is reported as damage and never shown.
A passcode is short, so it is never the whole key. It is stretched with Argon2id and combined with a random secret that never leaves the device and is guarded by its security chip where it has one. A copy of the vault's files cannot be opened with the passcode alone, and passcodes cannot be tried away from the device.
From the vault's key, HKDF-SHA256 derives a separate key for every file and for every other job, so no key does two things. When the vault locks, its key is wiped from memory.
- A backup is protected by the recovery key alone, stretched with a heavier Argon2id setting than the passcode. That is why a backup opens on another device and a copy of the vault's files does not.
- Lowering the cost of guessing in a vault's file does not help: the cost is part of the key, so a changed file only means the vault stops opening.
- The count of wrong tries is kept where deleting settings does not reset it, and the wait runs on a clock that changing the date does not move.
- Erasing removes the keys first, so nothing left on the device can be decrypted.
- A phone whose system was modified gets a warning in the app. The vault stays encrypted.
What differs from system to system
iPhone and iPad
- The secret lies in the keychain, for this device only, wrapped by a key in the Secure Enclave that cannot leave the chip. Every try of a passcode needs the chip itself, and the vault's files are in the system's strictest protection class.
Android
- The secret is encrypted by a key in Android Keystore, in StrongBox when the phone has it and in its regular secure hardware when not. Every try of a passcode passes through a second key in that hardware.
Mac
- A Mac with Apple silicon, or an Intel Mac with Apple's security chip, protects the secret with the Secure Enclave as an iPhone does. An Intel Mac without that chip keeps it in the keychain behind the Mac account's password, and setup says so before you choose a passcode.
Windows- On a computer with a TPM the secret is encrypted by a key inside that chip, and every try of a passcode needs the chip. Only where there is no TPM does Windows' own data protection keep the secret, and the screen where you choose the passcode says so.
Where it ends
- If malware already controls the system while the vault is open, what is on screen can be seen.
- Code that runs as JayLocked on a modified phone, or any program that runs as you on Windows, can ask the security chip for one passcode after another. The chip takes part in every try, which slows guessing down, and it does not count the tries itself.
- Pictures, video and sound are decoded by the system's own programs, and by libmpv on Windows. JayLocked cannot make them free of flaws, and it only ever opens what you added yourself.